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Control systems need to be able to operate under uncertainty and especially under attacks. To address such 
challenges, this paper formulates the solution of robust control for uncertain systems under time-varying and 
unknown time-delay attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). A novel control method able to deal with thwart 
time-delay attacks on closed-loop control systems is proposed. Using a descriptor model and an appropriate 
Lyapunov functional, sufficient conditions for closed-loop stability are derived based on linear matrix inequalities 
(LMIs). A design procedure is proposed to obtain an optimal state feedback control gain such that the uncertain 
system can be resistant under an injection time-delay attack with variable delay. Furthermore, various fault 
detection frameworks are proposed by following the dynamics of the measured data at the system’s input and 
output using statistical analysis such as correlation analysis and K-L (Kullback-Leibler) divergence criteria to 
detect attack’s existence and to prevent possible instability. Finally, an example is provided to evaluate the 
proposed design method’s effectiveness.
1. Introduction
During the last few years, uncertain systems have been widely en-
countered because of the environmental changes, systems’ failures, and 
disturbances [1, 2]. These systems have been widely used in the applica-
tion of electronic circuits, power systems, spring damping systems, and 
mechanical systems [3, 4, 5]. Since the industrial application of cyber-
physical uncertain systems increases, stealthy cyber-attacks may occur 
to prevent systems’ productivity and degrade systems’ performances.
One important factor that can cause instability in most practical sys-
tems is time-delay effects. These effects in nonlinear systems can be the 
main reason for weaknesses of control approaches in most cases [6], 
[7]. Therefore, several robust and adaptive strategies have been done 
to control uncertain and nonlinear systems under time-delay effects 
with the assumption of parametric uncertainties. Therefore, several 
robust and adaptive strategies have been done to control uncertain 
and nonlinear systems under time-delay effects with the assumption 
of parametric uncertainties [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], such as approaches 
with backstepping and dynamic surface designs [14, 15]. In [16], a set 
✩ Funding received from the Horizon 2020 Research Programme of the European Commission under the grant number 956059 (ECO-Qube) is hereby gratefully 
acknowledged.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: amirreza.zaman@ltu.se (A. Zaman).
of network-based uncertain systems is introduced by modeling these 
problems with event-triggered robust filtering. A recent event-triggered 
control proposition is stated in [17] to synchronize a switched delayed 
neural network. When it comes to decentralized nets, in [18], the event-
triggered filtering for a decentralized network interconnecting nonlin-
ear system is developed. Also, some event-triggered methods using a 
periodic sampled-data control and with fuzzy systems are introduced in 
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In [24], the networked control of uncertain non-
linear systems is investigated with an adaptive event-triggered strategy 
under unknown time-delay conditions.
Even though various studies have been done regarding robust and 
adaptive control of uncertain systems, a few approaches are related to 
designing the robust and adaptive control strategies of uncertain CPSs 
with time delays and considering cyber components. Besides, because 
of the unavailability of error surfaces of the measured and sent state in-
formation by sensors in CPSs, which various attackers could alter these 
surfaces, previous approaches [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24] cannot be applied to prevent cyberattacks in uncer-
tain CPSs. Thus, the problem of designing control methods to resist 
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uncertain time-delayed CPSs against different attack strategies is still 
an interesting subject to follow and consider.
Some approaches have been devoted to state the importance of the 
security issue of CPSs [25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. Control problems in these 
systems are categorized into three groups based on different cyber-
attack scenarios; denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [30, 31, 32, 33], de-
ception attacks [34, 35, 36, 37, 38], and replay attacks [39, 40, 41]. 
The latest studies regarding security control of CPSs against cyberat-
tacks are as follows. In [42], the issue of designing event-based security 
control for uncertain state-dependent systems with the existence of hy-
brid attacks is proposed. Besides, the finite-time 𝐻∞ filtering method 
for networked state-dependent uncertain systems under multiple attacks 
(DoS, deception, and replay attacks) by considering the event-triggered 
approach is investigated in [43]. Another control strategy of nonlinear 
time-delayed CPSs under unspecific deception attacks is developed in 
[44], in which an adaptive, resilient, dynamic surface control using the 
neural-network scheme is proposed for deception attacks on both sensor 
and actuator sides.
One kind of malicious attack that can cause trouble in operating un-
certain systems is a time-delay attack. A time-delay attack on a control 
system is the reason for adversaries that fundamentally add time de-
lays into such systems and potentially forcing them to instability and 
crash. A recent approach has been made regarding time-delay attacks 
[45]. First, it is shown that cryptographic methods against these attacks 
would be useless in detecting cyber components. A cryptography-free 
time-delay attack recovery (CF-TDR) communication protocol is devel-
oped to identify failures and recover from these attacks’ destructive 
effects.
Previous designed robust control approaches against time delays 
considered the existence of time-independent delays with known val-
ues. There is still no approach to investigating time-delay attacks with 
unknown and time-varying values on uncertain systems with a robust 
approach to detect these attacks and recover the system’s performance. 
Various protection-based methods against data injection attacks have 
been developed lately. Most of them involve using protected measure-
ment data or using estimated system data. However, if the attackers 
can infiltrate security systems and manipulate metering data, the con-
trol system will be compromised. On the other hand, these methods 
may not detect contaminated data with a statistical distribution similar 
to the previously measured safe data.
It is well known that a robust controller can often maintain states 
of a system bounded against various types of uncertainties, which can 
be the modeling uncertainties or environmental uncertainties. On the 
other hand, if unknown and time-varying delays are injected into the 
system’s performance by an intruder, formerly applied robust control 
approaches cannot be further beneficial. Consequently, the uncertain 
system’s stability under unknown and time-varying delays will be en-
hanced, and hence, the states of the system will remain bounded under 
various time delays. Besides, it is necessary to detect the delay’s occur-
rence to implement other safety protocols. The main contributions are 
itemized as follows:
1. We allocate a robust controller that attenuates and partially elim-
inates the harmful effects of delayed contaminated data injection 
on system stability. Besides, to show the proposed approach’s ef-
ficiency, the amount of delay is assumed to be randomly selected. 
Therefore, the designed feedback controller will prevent system in-
stability based on random time delays.
2. We define uncertainties in the system as unknown values with the 
norm-bounded feature. Using a descriptor model representation 
and an appropriate Lyapunov functional, we formulate sufficient 
conditions for closed-loop stability based on the linear matrix in-
equalities (LMIs).
3. We present the online fault detection framework by following the 
dynamics of the measured data at the system’s input and output 
to prevent the operating system from going into the faulty phase 
as quickly as possible. Attack detection methods are proposed and 
compared using statistical analysis such as correlation analysis and 
K-L divergence attack detection criteria.
4. Simulation results verify that the considered uncertain system will 
be resilient against malicious time-delay attacks. Therefore, the 
trustworthiness of the system’s performance will be enhanced over 
time by applying the developed robust control protocol. Addition-
ally, using the provided fault detection strategies, stealthy time-
delay attacks can be detected at the time of their occurrence.
This paper’s remainder is as follows: In Section 2, the uncertain 
control system is analyzed under the time-delay attack, and then, the 
robust 𝐻∞ delay-independent controller is proposed to overcome insta-
bility conditions in the system. In Section 3, various statistical attack 
detection methods are reviewed to detect faults in the system under the 
time-delay attacker’s existence. Eventually, numerical simulations and 
concluding sections are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. Time-delay attack analysis for uncertain systems
2.1. Problem statement
Real-life processes in a smart fashion such as smart industrial sys-
tems can be modeled as nonlinear systems. Assume the nonlinear system 
given by the below state-space equations
?̇? (𝑡) = 𝑓 (𝑥) + ?̃?𝑢(𝑡),
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑥(𝑡),
(1)
where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅𝑛 and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑅𝑚 are the state and the control input vectors, 
respectively. Furthermore, ?̃? is the input matrix, 𝑓 (𝑥) is the nonlinear 
function of system states, and C is the output matrix of the system. 
Suppose the obtained linearized model around its equilibrium point is 
controllable and also has the state-space matrices (𝐴, 𝐵). So, 𝑓 (𝑥) and 
?̃? can be decomposed as
{
𝑓 (𝑥) = (𝐴+Δ𝐴)𝑥(𝑡),
?̃? = 𝐵 +Δ𝐵,
(2)
where Δ𝐴, Δ𝐵 are model uncertainties and 𝐴, 𝐵, Δ𝐴, and Δ𝐵 have 
applicable dimensions. Thus, the model of continuous-time uncertain 
system (1) (or approximation of system in a region of interest by an LTI 
system), can be expressed as following uncertain state space equations
?̇? (𝑡) = (𝐴+Δ𝐴)𝑥 (𝑡) + (𝐵 +Δ𝐵)𝑢(𝑡),
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑥(𝑡).
(3)
It is assumed that the attacker tries to inject a time-delay attack to 
force the system to be unstable or have abnormal operations. We can 
consider the given uncertain system (4) with an augmented time-delay 
attack as:































is assumed as a delay 
attack strategy, with 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0. It should be noted that the delay term 
𝑔𝑖(𝑡) is assumed to be time-varying to obtain more general results in 
the paper for a worst-case scenario and to show the effectiveness of 
the proposed robust control solution with any random values of 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) in 
further analysis.
The purpose of the control solution protocol is to frame a delay-
independent robust 𝐻∞ controller 𝑢(𝑡) =𝐾𝑥(𝑡), which assures the robust 
stability of the system under delay attacks for maximum and unknown 
delay 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0. The structure of robust security control for the net-
worked control system with time-delay attacks is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The structure of the CPS with the proposed robust controller and attack 
detection unit under unknown time-delay attacks.
2.2. Robust 𝐻∞ controller design for closed-loop uncertain CPSs
With the proposed robust 𝐻∞ control law 𝑢(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑥(𝑡), we have a 
closed-loop system as















where 𝐾 is the robust controller feedback gain and
?̃?0 =𝐴0 +Δ𝐴0, (6)
(
𝐴0 =𝐴+𝐵𝐾, Δ𝐴0 =Δ𝐴+Δ𝐵𝐾
)
and
?̃?𝑖 =𝐷𝑖 +Δ𝐷𝑖, (7)
where 𝐷𝑖 and Δ𝐷𝑖 are specific fixed-valued real matrices of applicable 
dimensions. Moreover, the possible system’s uncertainties are described 









Δ𝐷𝑖 =𝐷𝑖𝐹𝑖(𝑥, 𝑡)𝐸𝑖, (9)
where D0, E𝑎, E𝑏, D𝑖, and 𝐸𝑖 are fixed-valued real matrices of applica-
ble dimensions. Besides, 𝐹𝑖(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝐹0(𝑥, 𝑡) are anonymous real-valued 




(𝑥, 𝑡)𝐹𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑡) ≤ 𝐼, (10)
𝐹 𝑇
0
(𝑥, 𝑡)𝐹0 (𝑥, 𝑡) ≤ 𝐼, ∀𝑡. (11)
Assumption A1. In deriving formulas, it is assumed that:
𝑘∑
𝑖=1
||?̃?𝑖|| < 1, (12)
where |.| is any matrix norm. With the above assumption, both stability 
conditions associated with continuous and continuously differentiable 
initial functions are equivalent. To derive stability conditions, the fol-
lowing lemmas are essential to mention.
Lemma 1 ([46, 47]). For any 𝑧, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑛 and any positive definite matrix 
𝑋 ∈𝑅𝑛×𝑛,
−2𝑧𝑇 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧𝑇𝑋−1𝑧+ 𝑦𝑇𝑋𝑦. (13)
Lemma 2 ([46, 47]). Let A, D, E, and F be real matrices of appropriate 
dimensions with ‖𝑭‖≤ 𝑰 . Accordingly, it can be concluded that:
For any scalar 𝜺 > 0,
𝐷𝐹𝐸 +𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝐷𝑇 ≤ 𝜀−1𝐷𝐷𝑇 + 𝜀𝐸𝑇𝐸, (14)
for any matrix 𝑯 > 0 and scalar 𝜺 > 0, which applies to the inequality 
𝜀𝐼 −𝐸𝐻𝐸𝑇 > 0,
(𝐴+𝐷𝐹𝐸)𝐻(𝐴+𝐷𝐹𝐸)𝑇
≤𝐴𝐻𝐴𝑇 +𝐴𝐻𝐸𝑇 (𝜀𝐼 −𝐸𝐻𝐸𝑇 )−1𝐸𝐻𝐴𝑇 + 𝜀𝐷𝐷𝑇 , (15)
for any matrix 𝑯 > 0 and scalar > 0, which applies to the inequality 
𝐻 − 𝜀𝐷𝐷𝑇 > 0,
(𝐴+𝐷𝐹𝐸)𝑇𝐻−1 (𝐴+𝐷𝐹𝐸) ≤𝐴𝑇 (𝐻 − 𝜀𝐷𝐷𝑇 )−1𝐴+ 𝜀−1𝐸𝑇𝐸. (16)
2.3. Delay-independent stability for an uncertain system with time–delay 
attack
To find delay-independent stability condition, the descriptor repre-
sentation of the system is given as follows
?̇? (𝑡) = 𝑦 (𝑡) , (17)















By defining the Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional candidate as:
𝑉 (𝑡)=
[







































𝑇 (𝑠)𝑑𝑠, Ui>0, (21)
further results from the Theorem 1 can be concluded.
Theorem 1. Under assumption A1, the uncertain system (3) under the in-
jection time-delay attack introduced in (4) is stable for all delay values 





, 𝑋1 = 𝑋𝑇1 >
0, 𝑋2 , 𝑋3, 𝑄𝑖 =𝑄
𝑇
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, 𝑈 𝑖 =𝑈
𝑇
𝑖
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, 𝜃7 = −𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑖),
𝜃8 = −𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑈 𝑖), 𝜉𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘.
Then, the optimal state-feedback gain is then calculated by 𝐾 = 𝑌 𝑋−1
1
where 
the augmented closed-loop matrix is denoted as 𝐴0 =𝐴 +𝐵𝐾 .
Proof. See the appendix in the article’s supplementary files. □
The primary importance of the presented robust approach is to 
provide a method to formulate the uncertainties caused by the cyber 
attacks instead of modeling with stochastic processes (system uncertain-
ties and insufficient information from attackers are mostly modeled by 
considering noise and stochastic processes). Thus, we proposed a delay-
independent 𝐻∞ approach to reduce the disturbances’ effects caused by 
the attacker and increase the system’s robustness. Consequently, finding 
a solution to the discussed optimization problem yields to providing a 
method to counteract the disturbing effects of the attacker. However, it 
is not straightforward to propose an analytical solution in general, and 
hence, the robust protocol is formulated using LMI methods. The devel-
oped robust strategy performs conservatively, and we tried to reach the 
optimal solution using the descriptor representation stated in (17) and
(18).
In cases that it is hard to satisfy proposed LMI conditions, the main 
LMI problem can be reformulated to a convex optimization problem 
with LMI conditions to provide a trade-off between the controller’s per-
formance and the system’s sensitivity to the disturbances by setting the 
LMI conditions less than a constant error value. On the other hand, 
the considered attack form in (4) is formulated in a relatively complex 
formation, and therefore, further equations are derived in general con-
ditions. For exceptional cases, feasible solutions can be achieved.
Remark 1. If we assume that the attacker has complete access to 
the control network and can inject time delays into the communica-
tion channels (worst-case attack scenario), consequently, the imme-
diate measurement of the process state 𝑥(𝑡) and the actuator signal 









the dynamic of the system (4) is reduced to
















According to (24), by substituting 𝐻1 by 𝐵𝑑 (YX−11 ) and then setting 
B=0 in LMI condition (22), a time-independent criterion for analyzing 
the stability condition of the system (24) using the results in Theorem 1
will be obtained.
Remark 2. It should be noted that there is always a small amount of 
delay in transmitting data packets in smart network control systems, 
even without any attacks in the system. When time-delay attacks occur, 
the attacker’s delay is augmented to this intrinsic network communica-
tion’s delay value. Besides, in analyzing delays in small-scale networks, 
only the delay from the time-delay attack is mostly considered to de-
rive formulas. However, in large-scale networks such as large-scale load 
frequency control networks with time-delay attacks [45], the system’s 
delay should also be considered to avoid the network’s instability in a 
large-scale fashion. In this article’s formulations, the augmented delay 
term is assumed to be a general delay term to cover the system’s delay, 
too. By this assumption, this paper’s methodology can be implemented 
to overcome the issue of the existence of the system’s delay and the 
attacker’s delay together.
3. Fault detection for a robust, resilient control protocol against 
time-delay attacks
Knowing the attack event and the maximum tolerable time delay, 
an attack detector will direct the system into an alarm state. Under the 
investigated control strategy, the proposed scheme is maintained in a 
stable condition in the alert state by the designed robust controller. It 
remains in this state until the system status is restored. This method 
can be used as an economical and straightforward method to ensure in-
dustrial control systems’ stability and safety. In the presented control 
method, due to the system being stable at the time of the attack event 
and due to the system states’ limited values, we expect to be able to 
implement the residual-based fault detection methods or distance selec-
tion criteria to detect a fault in the system. In this section, we compare 
and analyze the ability of different attack detection techniques.
3.1. Fault detection based on maximum correlation
The correlation coefficient is one of the criteria used to determine 
the association between two variables. The correlation coefficient indi-
cates the severity of the relationship and the type of connection (direct 
or inverse). This coefficient is between 1 and -1 and is zero if there is 
no relationship between the two variables. The correlation coefficient 
between the two input variables 𝑢 (𝑘) and the output of state 𝑥 (𝑘) is 
defined as follows:
𝜌 (𝑢 (𝑘) , 𝑥 (𝑘)) =








𝑢 (𝑘) − 𝜇𝑢
)(









𝑥 (𝑘) − 𝜇𝑥
)2 ,
(25)
where 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜇𝑢 are the average of the input and output data. The most 
important thing to remember about the correlation coefficient is that 
the correlation coefficient only indicates the linear relationship between 
two variables.
In the non-attack mode, according to (4), the output change is stat-
ically related to the input change; that means any arbitrary inputs en-
tirely generate different output values. So, if the data does not change, 
the output of the system will be retained. Thus, we expect that by in-
jecting the attack’s signal into the system, we will see a decrease in the 
correlation between the system’s input and output variables. With a de-
lay in the system, we expect the correlation coefficients to be decreased 
due to input and output sequences since the output does not correlate 
with the input. Therefore, in the delay-based attack detection algorithm 
and the general correlation-based delay estimation, the correlation co-
efficient between the input sequence and the output sequence can be 
calculated. Furthermore, the delay length corresponding to the maxi-
mum confidence coefficient can be considered as an estimation of the 
time delay value. Besides, the simulation results illustrate that the cor-
relation coefficient is effective for accurately identifying the time-delay 
attack.
3.2. Fault detection based on K-L divergence analysis
One of the most common methods for detecting the malicious in-
jected data is to monitor the dynamics of the measured data from 
the system and use the distance criterion. To quantify measurement 
changes, one can use both absolute distance indices and the K-L diver-
gence criterion. For both distance indices, the two probability distribu-
tions 𝑃 and 𝑄 must be considered, where the probability distribution 
𝑄 is the statistical distribution of non-invasive measurements and 𝑃 is 
also the statistical distribution of the measurement data exposed to in-
jecting contaminated data. If there is no attack, the distance index will 
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be relatively small, while the mentioned index will increase when the 
attacker’s malicious data is injected into the system. By comparing the 
current time interval index 𝑃 with 𝑄, one can determine whether inac-
curate data has been injected into the system or not. In the following, 
the common distance-based statistical attack detection criteria are re-
viewed and in the numerical results, their effectiveness in detecting the 
current article’s proposed attack is investigated.
3.2.1. Absolute distance criterion
A simple comparison criterion for the two probability distributions 
𝑃 and 𝑄 is the calculation of the absolute distance and can be defined 
as follows
𝐷𝐴 (𝑃 ∥𝑄) =
∑
𝑥
|𝑃 (𝑥) −𝑄(𝑥)|. (26)
3.2.2. K-L divergence measurement
For the two probability distributions 𝑃 and 𝑄, the K-L divergence 
criterion is defined as
𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃 ∥𝑄) =
∑
𝑥
𝑃 (𝑥) log𝑃 (𝑥)∕𝑄(𝑥) . (27)
Two essential features of the K-L divergence criterion are that it: (1) 
is always non-negative, i.e., 𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃 ∥𝑄) ≥ 0; and (2) equals to zero if, 
and only if 𝑃 = 𝑄.
When the inaccurate, malicious data is injected into the system, the 
probability distribution of the altered measurement data deviates from 
the probability distribution of the error-free data, resulting in a more 
considerable K-L divergence calculated value.
Corollary 1. If the two distributions 𝑃 and 𝑄 are Gaussian, the introduced 
K-L divergence criterion can be simplified as the following























where 𝜇𝑃 and Σ𝑃 are the mean and covariance of the sequence 𝑃 , and also, 
𝜇𝑄 and Σ𝑄 are defined as the mean and covariance of the sequence 𝑄. Also, 
𝑛 is the dimension of the sequences in general.
4. Numerical simulations
The effectiveness of the proposed robust 𝐻∞ control strategy under 
a time-delay attack is illustrated in this section.
An uncertain CPS with a malicious time-delay attack is assumed as 
the following form:
?̇? (𝑡) = (𝐴+Δ𝐴)𝑥 (𝑡) +𝐵𝑢 (𝑡) + (𝐷1 +Δ𝐷1)?̇? (𝑡− 𝑔(𝑡)) +𝐻1𝑥 (𝑡− 𝑔(𝑡)) ,
(29)
















































Table 1. Calculated MSE of system states with the pro-
posed robust control strategy against time-delay attacks 
under various system uncertainties.
‖Δ𝐵‖2 𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝑥1) 𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝑥2) 𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝑥3) 𝑠𝑢𝑚
0 0.0211 0.0148 0.0129 0.0489
0.4 0.0341 0.0156 0.0194 0.0692
0.8 0.0549 0.0165 0.0370 0.1085
1.2 0.0865 0.0177 0.0678 0.1720
The total simulation time was set to 20 sec, and the sampling time to 
0.02 sec. Based on the considered attack scenario, a time-delay attack 
is injected at time t = 8 sec with the maximum delay 𝑇0 = 4 sec to all 
system states.
Fig. 2 shows the system’s instability under this attack with the for-
merly developed robust controller as the one stated in [4]. We can 
conclude from Fig. 2 that designing a new robust control strategy is 
a must. Therefore, according to the developed robust control strategy, 






Moreover, Fig. 3 depicts the provided system’s stability with the pro-
posed robust controller against time-delay attacks. Additionally, Fig. 4
shows that system states and the proposed robust control signal under 
the time-delay attack remain bounded. As a result, the system could 
tolerate unknown time-delay attacks with the developed robust control 
strategy with the presented robust approach. Additionally, the system 
states’ mean square error (MSE) values from the proposed robust con-
trol method based on various uncertainties under time-delay attacks 
are calculated in Table 1. According to Table 1, system states remain 
bounded under time-delay attacks with different uncertainty values.
Next step is to detect the attack’s occurrence with various fault de-
tection methods introduced in previous sections. Fig. 5 indicates the 
calculated correlation coefficient values before and after the time-delay 
attack. It can be observed that for data without attack, correlations are 
relatively close to 1 or -1, while the time-delay attack decreases the 
correlation coefficient value.
Another way to detect faults can be developed by using the absolute 
distance criterion. Absolute distances 𝐷𝐴 and 𝐷𝐾𝐿 between 𝑃 (system 
with attack) and 𝑄 (system without attack) are indicated in Fig. 6. So, it 
can be inferred that injecting false data attacks to the system enhances 
the Absolute distance values 𝐷𝐴 and 𝐷𝐾𝐿.
In false data injection attacks, compared with absolute distance 
(Fig. 6.a), the K-L distance (Fig. 6.b) is more significant. Therefore, in 
total, the absolute distance criterion is not an ideal candidate to test 
false data injection attacks’ existence. To detect false data injection at-
tacks with the K-L divergence criterion, we should analyze and set its 
detection threshold from the standard data. If the K-L divergence run-
time is larger than the threshold, false data have likely been injected 
into the system.
It is worth noticing that the absolute distance and K-L divergence 
methods only require the system’s output data in a non-attack mode 
or at least an accurate estimation of the system’s output. Since the de-
signed controller is relatively resistant to attack, the system’s output 
data does not change much abruptly, and based on Fig. 6, there would 
be no significant changes in 𝐷𝐴 and 𝐷𝐾𝐿 at the time of the onset of 
the attack. Although these attack detection parameters grow over time, 
injection of contaminated data into the system can be detected by de-
creasing the correlation level of the system’s input and output data at 
the time of the attack event.
Remark 3. By the developed control method, the goal is to prevent the 
system from entering the destruction phase and, at the same time, to de-
tect attacks. Therefore, previously introduced residual-based detection 
methods will be significantly ineffective in detecting attacks with low-
amplitude or a small number of delays. So, considering a delay in the 
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Fig. 2. A) Instability of the uncertain system states trajectory by implementing conventional robust controller [4] under the time-delay attack, and B) assumed time 
delay attack 𝑔(𝑡).
Fig. 3. A) System states convergence against time-delay attack with the proposed robust controller, and B) assumed time delay attack 𝑔(𝑡).
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Fig. 4. A) The proposed bounded robust control trajectory and B) system states trajectory under the time-delay attack injected at time 𝑡 = 8 𝑠𝑒𝑐.
Fig. 5. Correlation trajectory between states and control signal before and after the time-delay attack’s existence.
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Fig. 6. Measurement variation with false data injection attacks in 𝑡 = 8 𝑠𝑒𝑐: A) Absolute distance value 𝐷𝐴. B) K-L divergence value 𝐷𝐾𝐿.
system with the variable sinusoidal behavior is practically the worst-
case scenario. Based on this article’s approach, the system can maintain 
its stability under this condition, as shown in simulation results. Thus, 
the system’s response accuracy will be much higher than other control 
strategies, specifically in industrial systems.
Remark 4. Since the proposed robust control strategy can maintain the 
system states bounded under time-delay attacks with time-varying and 
unknown delays, the trustworthiness of the system’s performance is in-
creased. Moreover, by proposing the statistical methods to detect faults 
for the mentioned attacks, we illustrated in simulation results that at-
tacks can be detected at the time of their occurrence and thus, we stated 
the term ‘Trust-based’ in the paper title to state that both provided fault 
detection and robust control strategies are trustworthy.
5. Conclusions
This article has proposed the secure, robust control design issue 
against unknown time-delay attacks of uncertain CPSs. The system’s 
stability has been analyzed using a descriptor model representation and 
appropriate Lyapunov functional conditions for the closed-loop system. 
Furthermore, closed-loop security has been guaranteed by calculating 
the optimal feedback control gain in linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). 
Different time-delay attack detection frameworks have been proposed 
and compared according to the statistical analysis fault detection meth-
ods such as correlation analysis and Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence 
criteria from the mathematical view and in simulations. Finally, nu-
merical results illustrated that the closed-loop uncertain system could 
remain stable with the proposed robust controller under time-delay at-
tacks. The proposed approach can be applied to controlling systems 
with inaccurate models with variable environmental changes. Besides, 
suppose the system includes some delays or a threat of system insta-
bility due to delay effects caused by environmental changes. In that 
case, the presented conservative robust approach can be used to pro-
vide the system’s stability, and it will enhance the system’s resiliency. If 
the injected attack signals involve non-Gaussian distributions, new ro-
bust approaches should be developed since this paper’s design cannot 
maintain the system’s stability under non-Gaussian adversaries. Thus, 
subsequent studies include the security analysis of various types of CPSs 
in smart infrastructures under time-delay adversaries added to different 
types of Gaussian/non-Gaussian cyber threats and the design of associ-
ated fault detection and protection strategies.
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